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Abstract
Notwithstanding EC’s invitations to promote competition in the electricity industry, only the UK 
seems to have evolved towards a real liberalization, while the other countries have introduced few 
innovations. Italy and France are organized as integrated monopolies, whereas Germany still remains 
a collection of mixed owned or public owned “de facto” regional monopolies. Each country is 
characterized by different regulatory systems aimed at controlling tariffs, productivity and quality. 
In tliis study v/e have evaluated the performance of three large electricity companies: EdF, ENEL and 
R WE, in order to estimate how regulation contexts and regulatory interventions could have influenced 
their results. EdF shows the best performance characterized by a rising trend during the eighties, 
whereas Enel enjoyed good results in the seventies followed by a stagnation period until 1987; after 
a negative trend until 1989, RWE seems to have shown some signs o f recovery in recent years. The 
empirical findings are consistent with theoretical suggestions about the weaknesses of rate of return 
regulation and the impact of quality constraints regarding the factors.
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1. Introduction
Econom ic perform ances o f  firms are attributable to  m anagerial skills as well as to external 
factors, such as governm ent interventions, m arket trends, evolution o f  prices o f  raw  
m aterials, and so on.
The influence o f  external factors m ight be very im portant in regulated  industries. In 
particular, in the electricity industry, policies such as control o f  prices, subsidization, fiscal 
facilitations, play an im portant role in explaining the perform ance o f  firms.
Focusing on regulated industries, it is possible to  find out som e com m on characteristics 
affecting the supply and the demand o f  goods o r services. O n the supply side, the possible 
presence o f  significant economies o f  scale implies that average costs decline w ith firm s’ 
dimensions. A nother com m on feature is the considerable level o f  capital intensity, as in m ost 
regulated industries fixed costs such as plants and equipm ent are very high. M oreover, as they 
have been characterized by considerable technical changes, utilities have had good 
opportunities to  increase efficiency (Cowing and Stevenson, 1981). O n the dem and side, 
regulated industries have attracted  an increasing demand over the years. From  the above 
discussion, it seem s that there are large potentialities for obtaining efficient results, especially 
for m onopolistic firms. In reality, interventions such as price policies, cross-subsidization o f  
tariffs and favours accorded to some critical industries have a considerable influence on 
mitigating the w eight o f  the potentially favourable profit conditions.
European bodies have recently focused on the electricity industry, for the purpose o f  
constructing a  Single European M arket for energy. This aim should be obtained through free 
exchanges betw een the m em ber States and com petition betw een firms in a com m on regulated 
environment. The behaviours o f  European countries in the face o fE C ’s bodies proposals are 
very heterogeneous and vary from  the introduction o f  a real com petitive m arket (England 
and Wales) to  the maintenance o f  a totally integrated system  (France). Even if  this situation 
is changing and going tow ards m ore com petition at present w e may find many m onopoly 
structures that probably will still be operating for a long time. M oreover we m ust not forget 
that electricity distribution will m aintain its conditions o f  natural m onopoly at least in sub­
national areas. For these reasons it becom es im portant to identify the econom ic goals o f  
regulation and to assess the perform ance o f  firms operating in different m onopoly conditions. 
In this study we will com pare the perform ances obtained by three firms: EN EL, EdF and 
RW E. The form er two are structured as national State-ow ned m onopolies, while the latter 
is a m ixed-owned firm which controls about 26% o f  the G erm an electricity generation. 
The theoretical background about regulated m onopolies is review ed in section 2. Section 3 
deals w ith the main characteristics o f  Italian, French and G erm an electric pow er industries, 
while section 4 concentrates on the regulatory mechanisms operating in each country. In 
section 5 the m ethodology that has been adopted to m easure productivity  is presented and 
discussed. Section 6 contains the main results and section 7 summarizes.
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2.1. Economic goals o f  monopoly regulation
Regulation in natural m onopoly m arkets is mainly aimed at maximizing the sum  o f  consum er 
and producer surplus. This goal can be achieved by improving general cost efficiency within 
the firm’s existing technology as well as by introducing innovation through new  technologies. 
This means that regulatory constraints should induce Anns to  minimize their production costs 
(while remaining at the same time economically viable), to  produce outputs at economically 
efficient levels, to  innovate and to pursue diversification strategies only w here they are 
economically efficient (this implies that regulatory bodies should avoid deterring welfare 
maximizing diversification). In  our opinion the incentives tow ards those directions could be 
very im portant to  explain the perform ance o f  regulated electricity firms.
The theoretical literature dealing with the effects resulting from  different regulatory systems 
is mainly concerned w ith the property-rights, the different resource allocation resulting from 
alternative pricing schemes and the constraints about the quality o f  the service.
2. Monopoly regulation and incentives
2.2 Property rights and economic efficiency
A n important distinction betw een private and public enterprises relates to  the transferability 
o f  property rights and the connected consequences concerning cost-minimizing conducts 
(Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978). This theory suggests that, as it is very difficult ( if  not 
impossible) for ow ners o f  a public firm to  transfer their shares, the interest for the net present 
value o f  the A nn’s future perfonnances is reduced. On the contrary, the possibility to 
exchange ownership shares o f  a private finn creates good opportunities for capital gains 
which could be exploited by owners who are able to  find enterprises endow ed w ith more 
efficient procedures. As a consequence o f  this situation public enterprise m anagers are less 
m otivated than their private counterparts to  pay attention to future cash flows and therefore 
their opportunity  cost o f  inefficiency is reduced. M oreover, the reduced interest for the 
capitalization o f  current decisions involves short-run perspectives for strategic decisions. 
Some other argum ents are linked to the political pressure aim ed at obtaining votes which 
charges public firms w ith labour intensive processes.
There is empirical evidence that private perform ances are better than those obtained by public 
ow ned firms bu t, particularly for utilities such as electricity, gas and w ater, a counter­
argum ent could state that regulation systems could be able to  get over the implications o f  
property rights. M eyer (1975), studying a sample o f  electric pow er generation firms in the 
United States, provided the evidence o f  costs differences over public versus private 
ownerships. The com parison indicates significantly higher costs for privately owned firms 
that seem to be associated w ith a regulated environment. In particular, the results appear to 
be consistent w ith  the A verch-Johnson (1962) hypothesis about rate  o f  return  regulation 
which will be discussed in the next section.
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The debate concerning the electricity system  focuses on econom ic efficiency as a prim ary 
pricing target. The guidelines necessary to  implement an efficient price system  could be linked 
to  three prim ary objectives: a  fair financial return on capital, a fair distribution o f  the firm’s 
allowed revenue among the beneficiaries o f  the service and a rate  structure able to discourage 
the w aste o f  public service (B onbright, 1961). Putting aside the rate  design w e will focus our 
attention on the capability o fprice regulation to improve productivity by correcting costs and 
prices. Even if  from a theoretical point o f  view some effects are straightforw ard, on the 
empirical ground it is difficult to prove rigorously how  regulatory interventions might have 
induced firms to  minimize costs or to  set correct price levels (W enders, 1989).
From  the empirical point o f  view  there are two ways o f  regulation which could be associated 
on the one hand to  social contracts or price caps and on the o ther hand to rate o f  return 
schemes.
The literature about rate o f  return  regulation underlines som e positive effects. Its primary 
goal is to  come close to  the theoretical results o f  com petition, w here costs and revenues 
equate each other. The risks o f  costs increases and the benefits o f  costs reductions are to  be 
assigned to  consumers; in such an environm ent it could be easier for firms to produce quality 
and to undertake some innovative investments characterized by uncertain returns.
O n the other hand many research projects starting from  the w ork  o f  A verch and Johnson 
(1962) have stressed some inefficiencies created by rate o f  re tu rn  regulation. This literature 
emphasizes that a regulatory system based on this kind o f  constraints can generate a  process 
o f  misallocation o f  resources.
The “A-J effect” suggests that if the allowed rate o f  return  exceeds the correct rem uneration 
o f  capital firms will accept a capital labour ratio which does not allow a correct minimization 
o f  costs. M oreover, a diversified firm operating both in a com petitive and in a m onopoly 
m arket, under profit level regulat ion on the combined m arkets m ight have a long run incentive 
to  price below  long run marginal cost in the com petitive m arket and to  raise its prices in the 
m onopoly m arket. This means that potential entrants might find it m ore difficult to enter the 
competitive m arket (Doyle, 1994). Regulation could relate only to  the m onopoly m arket but 
problem s might occur about inform ation costs. It is difficult to  distinguish the portion o f  
com m on costs to  be assigned to m onopoly services from  that relative to  competitive services 
because o f  the firm ’s interest in increasing the portion o f  costs to  allocate to  the m onopoly 
business (Hillman and Braeutigam , 1989). M oreover, because o f  the presence o f  information 
asymmetries, rate  o f  return  regulation proves to be very expensive (Leite et al., 1994). 
Price cap regulation, which is based on  direct price constraints, could be a better w ay to 
replace the indirect rate o f  return  regulation.
U nder price level regulation the effective unlinking o f  the firm ’s allowed revenues from  its 
internal costs could create the interest to produce the required output at minimum cost. 
Furtherm ore, price-caps imply that firms have prospective behaviours as they are not 
determ ined by historical costs. It is possible to  point out som e draw backs o f  price level 
regulation. First, as the risks o f  cost increases are to  be borne by the firm, the latter might 
be reluctant tow ards new innovative investments. Second, it becom es m ore difficult for firms 
to  support unprofitable but socially desirable output expansions directed at getting a 
com plete service coverage. Social contracts are based on the same concept o fprice caps and 
can be considered as a variant having the same strong points and w eaknesses.
2.3 Resource allocation and pricing schemes
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2.4 Quality constraints
The provision o f  quality by a regulated m onopoly is m odelled by Laffont and Tiro le (1993). 
They examine the condition o f  “search goods” (where quality is observed before purchasing) 
and the condition o f  “experience goods” , (where quality is observed after purchasing): 
electricity falls into this latter case. They argue about the conflict betw een the incentive to 
supply quality and the opposite goal o f  cost reduction; the “cost-reim bursem ent rule” might 
contem poraneously lead to  the achievement o f  both  o f  the tw o objectives. A nyhow it m ust 
be noted  that the difficulties o f  measuring the quality costs w eaken the effectiveness o f  the 
regulatory system. Put in other w ords, “the m ore im portant quality is, the low er will be the 
pow er o f  the optimal incentive schem e” .
T um ing to  electricity system s, the implications o f  quality provisions could be enlarged to  the 
constraints about the nature o f  the productive factors and o f  the rate policy. W hen firms are 
obliged to use a particular kind o f  coal or a particular technology, to  supply areas w ith high 
distribution costs or to accept bureaucratic processes for the localization o f  new  plants that 
take a long time to  be carried out, it becom es difficult to  control productivity. In short, if  we 
decide on price cap, w e will probably reduce the incentive to  provide quality. On the other 
hand, if  w e prefer a rate  o f  return  system, we w'ill have fewer possibilities to obtain 
productivity improvements.
3. Electricity industries in Italy, France and Germany
In  1962 most o f  the existing Italian electric pow er companies w ere nationalized and grouped 
in a  single S tate-ow ned company, nam ed EN EL. From  that date on EN EL has been 
responsible for m ore than 80%  o f  electricity production and for m ore than 87%  o f  total 
distribution, the rest being controlled by some already existing municipal firms (4%  and 12% 
respectively), by some se lf  generators having a share o f  se lf p roduction higher than 70%  and 
by small firms w ith a yearly production-lower than 15 Gwh.
In 1982 private firms w ere allowed by law to produce electricity, bu t the bureaucratic 
restrictions and the low price o f  resale o f  surpluses to  EN EL rendered this reform  almost 
ineffective (Fraquelli and Ragazzi, 1994). M ore promisingly, in 1991 production by private 
companies was favoured, especially for energy produced by renew able sources and through 
co-generation, and exchanges betw een subsidiaries o f  the same group w ere allowed. Their 
prices o f  resale o f  surpluses to EN EL w ere also m ade favourable. This represented the first 
decisive step tow ards the creation o f  a more competitive industry. In 1992 EN EL was 
transform ed into a joint stock company; this was done in the perspective o f  a  future 
privatization that is still being discussed.
In France too there is a m onopoly w ith EdF producing 92%  and distributing 96%  o f  the total 
generated electricity. In fact the law that introduced nationalization in 1946 saved only some 
small existing pow er generators, some self producers, and few  municipal or State-ow ned 
distribution firms.
The policy carried out by the French governm ent was aimed at increasing the weight o f  the 
electric pow er industry, w ith a sequence o f  massive investments that led EdF to  becom e a 
structural exporter from  1982 on. Recently, following EEC bodies’ interventions about 
com petition and liberalization, a debate took  place in France and the dismantling o f  the
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m onopoly in electric pow er production was discussed, while the maintaining o f  the 
distribution m onopoly w as restated (M andil, 1994).
The electricity industry in the Federal Republic o f  Germ any is divided into three sectors: 
public supply, industrial supply and supply to the federal railway system. The first m arket 
absorbs more than 86% ofthe  total and includes all supplies o f  electric pow er to third parties. 
N ine big firms control almost all the production and the national distribution o f  high-voltage 
electricity; there are then about 40 regional distributors and 1000 local suppliers. It has been 
estim ated that RW E controls about 26%  o f  the to tal generated electricity in Germany. 
The system  is structured as a collection o f  regional and local m onopolies, since exclusive 
dealing and exclusive territories are allowed by concessions. Cooperation betw een potentially 
com petitive firms is not challenged by the federal antitrust law. This policy has the purpose 
o f  granting a sure and continuous supply but it involves a low  level o f  competition.
As to ownership, we could distinguish betw een private ownership, m ixed ownership and 
public authorities ownership, with the first one absorbing less than  20%  o f  the total 
generation and less than 10% o f  the total distribution o f  electric pow er.
4. EC rules and regulation in Italy, France and Germany
4.1 EC rules
In 1988 the EC Commission introduced some rules and principles for the purpose o f  creating 
an integrated European m arket for electricity. These guidelines concerned mainly the safety 
o f  supply and the prom otion o f  competitiveness: goals that should have been reached through 
free exchanges betw een the member states.
In  1989 all this was made m ore precise by specifying:
- right o f  transit on the big electricity grids;
- right o f  access o f  third parties to the electricity netw orks;
- transparency o f  tariffs;
- transparency o f  costs;
These proposals concretely concern a separate accountancy for generation, transm ission and 
distribution (unbundling), the abolition o f  m onopolies w ith regard  to exports and im ports, 
the increasing attention paid to  environmental p rotection and the abolition o f  cross­
subsidization betw een categories o f  consumers.
As far as the degree o f  compliance with EC rules is concerned, it seem s that only the U K  has 
implemented a radical reform  o f  its electricity industry. In fact, in 1990 the U K  governm ent, 
following a privatisation and liberalisation strategy, led to  the separation o fth e  industry into 
four areas o f  activity: generation, transmission, distribution and final supply. Production is 
almost completely controlled by tw o private firms and a state-ow ned firm, transm ission is 
entrusted to  a single com pany, which is owned by the twelve regional distribution firms. The 
latter are obliged to put their netw ork facilities at the disposal o f  third parties willing to  use 
them  and have been allowed to produce up to 25%  o f  the electric pow er they distribute. 
Finally, the commercial activity can be accomplished by the regional distributors, by some 
other intermediate firms o r by the producers themselves.
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4.2.1 Italy
In  1993 all Italian regulatory organisms were concentrated in C IPE , while in 1994 prices 
w ere put under the direct control o f  the M inistry o f  Industry. Since EN EL is a  public 
m onopoly, there has not been the need to  implement a formal regulatory authority responsible 
for the supervision o f  the electricity industry. This does not m ean that Italy has no t been 
affected by regulatory decisions; in fact it is possible to  identify at least tw o im portant 
interventions in the energy industry in Italy.
The first one is the Program m ing Contract o f  1991 which foresees that variations in the level 
o f  tariffs should be linked to variations in the costs o f  production, but ta riff  increases should 
be reduced by an improvement o f  productivity by 1.5% per year.
The second, a kind ofbehavioural code, was introduced by law in 1994 and refers to the public 
services supplies. Its main task is to improve quality in the service and to  prom ote efficiency 
in the m anagement o f  public utilities.
Regarding legislation, some interesting laws m ust be emphasized:
- the law o f  1982, made to  favour private pow er generators, still contained im portant 
drawbacks for new  firms willing to enter the electricity m arket. It has already been said that 
in this respect the law o f  1991 has been more effective;
- in 1992 EN EL was transform ed into a  joint stock company; this change together w ith the 
aim to  privatize involved the need to  study a concessionary schem e that w as transform ed 
into law in Septem ber 1995 with the institution o f  the authority for the energy industry. 
Finally, w e m ust not forget that the referendum  o f  1987 led to  the prohibition o f  the further 
use o f  nuclear sources to  produce energy, at least until 19931.
4.2.2 France
The French system  is based on a law dated 1946. EdF is controlled directly by the M inistry 
o f  Econom y and Finance and by the M inistry o f  Industry. There is no regulation authority, 
but some im portant contracts betw een EdF and the G overnm ent have been made:
- the Program m ing Contract 1970-1975 regarded investments and a ta riff  regulation scheme 
based on the nominal inflation rate;
- the First Planning Contract 1984-1988 was concerned with reducing the level o f  tariffs by 
paying attention to real price evolutions (Gabet, 1986);
- the Second Planning C ontract 1989-1992 was aimed at reducing electricity tariffs and at 
finding a solution for the worrying level o f  debt reached by EdF during the eighties. It is w orth  
noticing that in 1989 EdF signed an important contract w ith G dF (which m onopolizes the 
production and the distribution o f  gas in France) for the purpose o f  generating significant 
economies o f  scale through the harm onization o f  their respective D istribution Departm ents.
4.2 Regulation
l It is highly unlikely that a changing trend will occur in the near future.
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4.2.3. Germany
The G erm an electricity industry is based on a  law o f  1935. In  Germ any there are some 
different regulatory bodies:
at municipal level the councils grant exclusive concessions lasting 25 or 50 years and 
levy some taxes on electricity (about 20%  o fthe  firms’ incomes). The amounts relative 
to  the concession rights are generally high too;
at state level there is the supervision o f  actions that have been undertaken by the 
municipalities; the control is aimed at avoiding the presence and the developm ent o f  
small inefficient firms;
at the federal level the law o f  1935 encourages cooperation betw een firms, grants 
exclusive territories and exempts the electricity industry from  respecting antitrust 
rules.
As for regulation interventions we can distinguish betw een structural regulation and 
behavioural regulation. The former is relative to the concession o f  licences and authorizations, 
as well as to  the control o f  entries and exits, while the latter concerns the control o f  prices 
and profits:
investments, exit and entry: while investments in coal fired pow er plants are favoured, 
those in gas or oil based pow er plants are discouraged; in addition, the environm enta­
lists have put a serious obstacle to the developm ent o fthe  nuclear energy. As to entries, 
new  concessions are denied if  the region in question is already served, while firms that 
exit the m arket are preferably replaced by firms operating in the neighbouring regions 
(M uller and Stahl, 1995). The governm ent’s protection policy to  the advantage o fth e  
coal industiy finds further confirmation in the favour granted to  the tw o long-term  
contracts, signed betw een the state-ow ned coal mines and the electricity suppliers 
(O berlack, 1986).
right o f  way across municipal property, this is granted by exclusive concessions o f  
distribution o f  electricity lasting 25 or 50 years;
dominant power abuse\ the federal antitrust authority intervenes in situations where 
prices vary greatly betw een neighbouring exclusive territories and, m ore in general, 
w hen a  deviation from the behaviour that w ould be expected in a competitive 
environm ent is discovered.
In  1990 the reform  o f  the antitrust law involved the introduction o f  som e new  com petitive 
mechanisms, by stating that all new concessions should be accorded for a period low er than 
20 years, and that existing concessions older than 20 years should term inate in 1994. 
Regarding price regulation, Germany seems to  be continuing rate o f  return  regulation, 
whereas France, and to  a lesser extent Italy have paid more attention to  the containing o f  
costs, and have m ade use o f  social contracts as high- pow ered means o f  regulation.
Table 1 summarizes som e interventions directed at controlling the electricity industries in 
countries examined in this study (laws, program m ing contracts, private contracts approved 
or prom oted by the governm ents, etc.) as well as the effects that w ould be expected in the 
perform ance o f  firms.
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5. M easuring productivity
5.1 Total factor indices
The main econom ic activity o f  a firm consists in transform ing a set o f  inputs into one o r more 
outputs. There are different m ethods that might be used to  obtain the same output; for 
example, in the electricity industry different sources can be used  for fuel in order to produce 
electric pow er: table 2 shows the different set o f  materials that have been used by EN EL, EdF, 
and RW E. Similarly, inputs can be aggregated in several ways: table 3 highlights each input’s 
relative share in our three firms. The nature and the m agnitude o f  each input depend on several 
factors, such as the hom e country’s economic situation, the relative price o f  each input, the 
particular business links betw een firms (such as contractual relationships w ith firms operating 
in dow nstream  industries and in upstream  industries o r vertical integration links betw een 
subsidiaries o f  the same group), and the different legislation in force in each country. 
Regulation m ay be considered as part o f  this latter factor and influences economic decisions 
o f  firms.
Given a  set o f  inputs a m ore efficient technology results in a greater quantity o f  output. As 
different inputs have different costs this problem  turns into that o f  cost minimization. Then 
one firm is considered m ore efficient than other firms when it is able to obtain the same output 
by using a  cheaper set o f  inputs.
Two problem s arise at this point. The first one is relative to the degree o f  hom ogeneity 
betw een outputs: electricity is not the only output produced by electric pow er companies; 
for example quality is expensive and should be valued. Quality is particularly im portant as 
the electricity supply is essential for industries and for households. The frequency oftechnical 
faults and energy losses, the length o f  connecting tim es, the efficiency and the timeliness o f  
repairs and m aintenance w ork should be taken into consideration for a  correct analysis o f  
efficiency. In  the same context we could include the level o f  pollution produced by electric 
pow er firms, w ith the consequent need to make investments in order to reduce the harmful 
emissions o f  SO , and N O x and to move tow ards the use o f  cleaner sets o f  pow er sources. 
The second problem  is relative to the effects o f  inflation. As inflation rates affect the values 
o f  costs and sales erroneous increases in efficiency might result from  analysis based on 
current values. A  correct analysis should consider constant prices by assum ing a base-year 
for prices, so as to  concentrate the attention on the changes o f  the mix o f  physical inputs2. 
In  our analysis w e will make use o f  tw o total factor productivity m easures. The first one is 
represented by a quantity index which puts into relation outputs and inputs at base-year 
prices. The productivity ratio betw een tw o subsequent years is:
Z Y .1 • p.'°/ S Y .1'1 • p.[0 
i= l 1 1 i= l 1 '
2 The base year is 1989for EdF,and 1993 for ENEL and RWE. We have then multiplied physical quantities 
o f inputs and outputs by their base-year prices. The only exception relates to the depreciation rates 
employed for ENEL; we used 1983 as the base-year to obtain constant depreciation rates for the different 
categories of assets.
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where i indicates the different goods, h  indicates the different inputs and to  is the base year. 
As inputs are simply added up , it implies perfect substitutability.
The second m easure is the Tom qvist index, an approxim ation in the discrete case o f  the 
Divisia indices. The latter are derived from Solow ’s production  function, which implies 
constant returns o f  scale and neutral technological change (D iew ert, 1981). In the situation 
o f  one output and tw o inputs (labour and capital) it takes on  the following expression:
Y (t) =  A (t) • f  [ L (t), K (t) ], where A (t) is the technological progress; the relative variation 
o f  the technological progress over tim e is:
A (t) Y (t) L L(t) K(t) 1
with a  indicating the relative weight o f  labour and b indicating the relative weight o f  capital.
Putting dA (t)/A (t)=  A (t)/A (t) equal to  the variation o f  productivity over time 
(TFPD(t)/TFPD(t)) and considering the n-goods and g-inputs (X) case w e have:
TFPD(t) n
-  z e , ( t )  •
t fpd(o i=i Y,(t) h=l X,(t)
The Tom qvist approxim ation o f  the above index3 takes on the following form:
n
TFP TU-l
n  (Y i y . )i/2(®i-t+®i-‘-i) 
i=l
g
n ( x hj/ x htl)1/2{<l>hj+<t,h't-1)
h= l
The num erator and the denom inator can be considered as geom etric m eans o f  the quantity 
ratios w ith  w eights being represented by the average expenditure shares for factors and by 
the average sales shares for goods (M orrison, 1993). As the first indices are used w ith fixed- 
base prices and Tom qvist indices w ith variable-base prices, the latter take into account 
relative price changes; this means that they are sensitive to strategies that reduce the weight 
o f  such inputs that have becom e m ore expensive.
3 The same index has been adopted by Solimene (1994) in her study o f the productivity growth in the 
Italian telecommunication industry.
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5.2 Inputs and outputs
For EN EL w e derive six categories o f  users (households, public lighting, other custom ers 
purchasing up to  30 Kwh, from  30 to 500 Kwh and m ore than 500 Kwh, resellers); for France 
w e consider high-voltage, m edium-voltage and low-voltage sales; for RW E we separate 
direct deliveries (special contracts for supplies to  industries and public lighting, contracts 
w ith custom ers at tariffrates) and indirect deliveries (deliveries to electricity companies and 
exports).
L abour is m easured by the average num ber o f  employees for each year, while purchases o f  
electricity are expressed in Kwh.
As to the estim ation o f  the cost o f  capital, we m oved away from  the simple consideration o f  
financial charges; since a correct m easure o f  the to tal cost o f  capital should include the 
opportunity  cost o f  equity, firstly we have derived an estim ation o f  the to tal capital invested 
in the firm (by subtracting from net assets (at CPP prices) the am ount relative to  commercial 
debt and o ther current liabilities), secondly we have applied to that value a real rate ofintcrest 
o f  4.4% 4.
The level o f  depreciation has been obtained by employing tw o estimates; the first one is a 
simple revaluation o f  the book value as it is recorded in the profit and loss accounts. We 
believe that this value does not represent a good indicator o f  physical depreciation and 
econom ic obsolescence o f  installations and machinery, as fiscal reasons and inflation rates 
have an high influence on it and m ay lead to biased values that are not economically 
acceptable. The second estim ate, which results from  the application o f  the perpetual 
inventory m ethod, enables the obtaining o f  a “real value” o f  assets for each year. Average 
depreciation rates drawn from  annual reports have then been applied to the gross values o f  
fixed assets. This m ethod takes account o f  the fact that for each year the value o f  fixed assets 
is the result o f  a stratification process, with investments and disinvestments respectively 
increasing and decreasing the am ount recorded at the beginning o f  the year.
Starting from  a base year (1963 for Enel, 1971 for EdF and 1980 for RW E) additions and 
w ithdrawals have been added at constant prices following the equation below:
K t+n k  + 1 /n> •t+n-1 t-t-n t+n D /IP,t+n t-m-z
where Kt+n indicates the value o f  fixed assets for year t+n at the prices o f  year t and IP t+n is 
the price index for year t+n. The use o f  the price index o f  year t+n-z  for deflating withdrawals 
points ou t the fact that in general disinvestments are not relative to m achinery purchased 
o r constructed during the current year but instead they reflect w ithdrawals and sales o f  old 
equipment.
In our examined cases this process has led to very high values o f  gross fixed assets, as 
com pared to  the book values recorded in the balance-sheets; this reflects the fact that 
accounting system s based on historical costs do not take into account the effects o f  inflation.
4 This value represents the average real cost of long term Bonds and equity in Italy.
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6. The results
6.1 Structural differences between the firms
Before going on w ith the illustration and the discussion o f  our main results it is necessary to 
stress some rem arkable differences betw een our three firms. W hile EdF and EN EL are two 
state-ow ned monopolistic firms, RW E Energie is a  formally mixed ow ned firm operating in 
a  m ore com petitive environment (see section 2). EdF and EN EL are integrated forw ard in 
the transmission and distribution stages, but they are not integrated backw ard in the supply 
o f  fuel. O n the other hand RW E Energie is part o f  a group which has a com plete control over 
a  subsidiary that mines lignite which is highly used to generate electricity. The importance 
o f  R W E ’s interests out o f  the electricity industry has increased in time. In fact Energy 
absorbed 60%  o f  the to tal sales o f  the group in 1980, and ju st 35%  in 1993L 
Finally, productivity increases can be reached through a m ore efficient com bination o f  inputs, 
but they are also due to  the driving force o f  demand growth.
6.2 Partial productivity results
Regarding labour we can observe from  table 4a that EN EL and EdF have achieved good 
productivity results. From  1980 to 1993 they obtained almost the same improvement with 
an yearly average grow th rate respectively o f  4%  and 3.7% . The case o f  RW E is quite 
different, w ith a productivity level o f  workers remaining alm ost constant during the period. 
E dF ’s positive results are especially due to the production expansion strategy, while for Enel 
w e can see a good labour saving policy.
It is w orth  noticing that the high level o f  absolute efficiency indicated by the num ber o f  
custom ers per employee (table 5) offers a confirmation o f  the positive results reached by 
EN EL and EdF.
As for to tal consum ption, ifw e sum up the amounts ofpurchases and fuel consum ption (table 
4b), w e can notice that only Edfhas been able to contain its costs: the decreasing trend during 
the seventies was reversed during the eighties but only in 1986 was EdF able to  achieve the 
same levels recorded in 1971. The performance is clearly linked to  the nuclear program  which 
in the last few years allowed EdF to double its partial productivity levels5 6.
Physical capital productivity perform ances can be analysed by paying attention to the book 
values or, alternatively, through the application o f  the perpetual inventory method. I fw e  
consider the depreciation as it is booked in the profit and loss accounts, we find a picture in 
which only EN EL seems to  have had a negative performance. This is due to  the fact that in 
Italy, after a very difficult period (lasting until 1982-83) with insufficient rates and
5 The other main branches o f activity are mining (4%), oil and chemicals (40%), mechanical and plant 
engineering (11%).
6 These results do not include completely all the costs that EdF will bear in the future to manage its nuclear 
power plants after their dismantling. In fact, the provisions for the management o f nuclear sources booked 
in the balance sheets are estimates which could not correspond to the effective costs.
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consequently very low provisions, nominal depreciation rates have been increased to  recover 
inflation. For such reasons we do not believe that this information represents a  correct 
m easure o f  the depreciation o f  assets. The values obtained through the application o f  the 
perpetual inventory m ethod display a negative perform ance for all our three companies. We 
can analyse this result by stressing that R W E, like many other Germ an electric pow er firms, 
has made large investments for the purpose o f  containing the level o f  pollution produced by 
coal fired plants; on the other hand E N E L ’s problem s concerning the finding o f  sites for 
new  plants together w ith the environmental costs and the interruption o f  nuclear plans have 
played an im portant role7.
The perform ance o fthe  cost offtnancial capital suggests that EN EL has beenm ore successful 
in balancing external and internal sources, while EdF was characterized by financial problem s 
in the mid eighties. On the o ther hand RW E has show n a negative trend.
Table 4c and 4d consider the total cost o f  capital in its physical and financial aspects. I f  we 
com pare EN EL and EdF they seem to  have the same positive perform ance but w e cannot 
forget that nuclear technology leads to  a saving in fuel consum ption and purchases o f  
electricity.
6.3 Total factor productivity
The above discussion o f  partial perform ances offers a picture in which EdF holds a position 
o f  prim ary im portance: this finds further confirmation in the levels o f  to tal factor productivity 
indices. As can be observed in Figure 1 (TFP0 indices), EdF w as characterized by a rising 
trend during the eighties while EN EL, after having enjoyed good  results in the seventies, 
entered a stagnation period that ended around 1987. For RW E, some signs o f  recovery can 
be seen in the last few years following a negative trend lasting until 1989.
During the eighties the gap betw een the three firms became very wide giving evidence o fthe  
superiority o f  EdF. The increase o f  TFP reached 2.6%  per year against 0.9%  for EN EL and 
-1%  for RW E.
I f  we com pare the fixed-base indices (T FPB) with the Tom qvist indices, EdF and EN EL show 
lower levels o f  productivity, while RW E approximately confirms its previous levels. These 
findings are quite easily explained if  we consider that in France and in Italy the best 
perform ances come from  labour. This factor has been affected by higher price increases as 
com pared to the other ones. Since the base-year is 1993 for Enel and 1989 for EdF, the TFPfi 
indices are biased upwards. The Tom qvist index, by weighting each different quantity index 
w ith its relative share at current prices also highlights that EdF and EN EL have been 
characterized by increasing perform ances in factors which have progressively become more 
expensive8. This is not the case o f  RW E, which maintained quite a hom ogeneous cost 
structure during the eighties.
7 The cost o f production o f the new reconverted plants has doubled.
8 For the estimation of each factor's share at current prices, useful to weight every partial index and to build 
the Tomqvist index, we have decided not to use book-values for depreciation but we have inflated the 
amounts resulting from the application o f the perpetual inventory method.
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The com parison betw een sales o f  electricity and productivity trends during the eighties 
underlines that one explanation o f  the different perform ances could relate to Kaldor- 
V erdoom  effects linked to the different rate  ofdem and increase: 4.9%  for EdF, 3%  for ENEL 
and 0.4%  for RW E. As far as inputs are concerned, the improvements o f  productivity 
contributed in particular by labour savings could reduce the im portance o f  the different 
production technologies. A  closer observation gives the possibility to see that Enel and EdF, 
which are both vertically integrated, have almost the same level o f  labour productivity. M any 
studies provide the evidence o f  higher productivity levels o f  vertically integrated electric 
pow er firms (Kaserm an and M ayo, 1991) (Fraquelli and Ragazzi, 1995). The performance 
o f  the tw o firms seems to suggest that a wide integrated structure could offer more 
opportunities to  achieve managerial economies by reorganizing the activity o f  w orkers in the 
different stages o f  the service. H ow ever, it must be noted that RW E too  could enjoy some 
economies from  the subsidiaries o f  the group operating in the coal industry. In fact vertical 
economies have also been found in backward integrated activities (Kerkvliet, 1991).
The trend o f  the hom e-country demand and the organisation structure o f  each firm could 
represent some good supports for the interpretation o f  the results but they are still insufficient 
in that they do not explain the low level o f  TFP for EN EL and the negative results o f  RW E. 
Regulation seem s to  play an im portant role. R W E ’s partial productivity indices give the 
evidence o fthe negative performance o f  capital and consumption. The drawbacks concerning 
the overinvestm ent o f  capital which could occur w ith rate o f  return  regulation are evident 
in this case as the environmental investments do not justify such a high increase in capital 
assets. Turning to  consum ption, quality constraints about factors could be connected to the 
policy tow ards a  massive use o f  Germ an coal.
The constraints about the availability o f  factors are also evident in the case o f  Italy. 
Investments in new  capacity have been characterized in time by high marginal costs because 
o fth e  difficulties o f  finding new  sites and the frequent interruptions during the construction 
o f  plants. At the same time the new law (1991) succeeded in increasing private production 
(Figure 2). This result has been obtained w ithout com petition, with an high increase o f  
E N E L ’s costs o f  dom estic supplies from  private producers. A nyhow in the latest years the 
positive effects o f  social contracts devoted to improve productivity are supposed to be 
relevant but not sufficient to cover the costs o f  the environmental investments.
On the other hand E dF’s long experience with program m ing contracts based on efficiency 
goals underlines the importance o f  social contracts in the form  o f  a price-cap.
As our analysis is limited to three firms it is not possible to generalize but w e can state that 
many o f  our findings are consistent w ith theoretical suggestions about the im portance o f  
regulation and the superiority o f  systems based on direct efficiency controls.
6.4 How could these results be interpreted?
7. Concluding remarks
A competitive m arket could be the best solution for increasing productivity in the electricity 
industry. While we are moving tow ards that direction the quality o f  regulation can provide 
good results for integrated m onopolies too.
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The empirical results coming from the com parison betw een EdF, EN EL and RW E seem  to 
confirm  the above statem ent putting the regulatory incentives or constraints among the 
variables able to  explain the productivity performances.
Rate o f  return  regulation and policies in favour o f  German coal have reduced managerial 
attention tow ards efficiency creating the conditions for negative RW E perform ances on 
capital and consum ption. In  Italy the constraints on new  sites, the conversion o f  nuclear plants 
and the costs o f  dom estic supplies o f  private producers have w eakened the positive effects 
o f  dem and increase. E dF’s good perform ance has been generated by the increase o f  
production but the attention to costs reduction by a program m ing contracts policy has 
certainly favoured the improvement process.
.  15.
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